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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
MAX R. CARTER, ; 
Plaintiff / Appellant, ] 
vs. ] 
MILFORD VALLEY MEMORIAL ; 
HOSPITAL, a government agency of ] 
BEAVER COUNTY, ; 
Defendant / Appellee ] 
) Case No. 980500056 
) Priority 16 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The jurisdiction of the Court is established by Sections 78-2-2(4) and 78-2a-3(2)(j), Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Were the employees/agents of Defendant who performed automotive mechanical 
maintenance, repairs and/or replacement of an ambulance, health care providers under the Utah 
Health Care Malpractice Act? This issue was preserved by virtue of Plaintiff s opposition to 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 98-104). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review for reviewing a summary judgment is one of correctness; namely, 
whether the lower court's conclusions of law were correct, without giving any deference 
1 
whatsoever to those conclusions. Craftsman Builder's Supply v. Butler Manufacturing, 364 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 22, 24 (Utah 1999); Taylor v. Ogden School District. 927 P.2d 159, 162 (Utah 1996). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
1. Utah Code Ann. §78-14-3 (1998) is set forth verbatim in the Addendum herein. 
2. Utah Code Ann. §78-14-4 (1998) is set forth verbatim in the Addendum herein. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a case for wrongful death as a consequence of the delayed medical care to the 
decedent arising from a malfunctioning ambulance. This appeal is from a summary judgment 
entered by the Fifth District Court of Beaver County, State of Utah on February 2, 1999. That 
court ruled that because Defendant is a health care provider, it was protected from Plaintiffs 
claim of negligence by its employees/agents in the automotive maintenance of an ambulance, by 
the two-year statute of limitations set forth in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, U.C.A. § 
78-14-1 et.seq.(R. 109-114). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On October 8, 1995, Anna Rae Carter, a resident of Minersville, Utah, became ill and 
distressed. Her husband, Max R.Carter, the Plaintiff/Appellant in this action, called for 
emergency assistance from an ambulance located in Minersville ("the Minersville Ambulance") 
which was operated by Defendant/Appellee, Milford Valley Memorial Hospital. Upon arrival of 
the Minersville Ambulance at her home, Mrs. Carter was placed inside and they departed for the 
Beaver Valley Hospital, located in Beaver, Utah, some 18 miles away. (R. 112). 
Because the Minersville Ambulance began to experience mechanical difficulties, a 
second ambulance was called for by radio and dispatched from Beaver to meet the Minersville 
2 
Ambulance en route. Mrs. Carter was transferred to the Beaver Ambulance to continue the 
journey to the Beaver Valley Hospital. Mrs. Carter subsequently died on October 17, 1995. (R. 
112). 
Plaintiff filed the Complaint in this action on January 6, 1998, over two years after the 
incident in question.1 In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the Minersville Ambulance broke 
down and had to wait for the Beaver Ambulance, resulting in a delay of some twenty minutes. 
The Complaint further alleges negligent care and maintenance of the Minersville Ambulance, 
causing a delay in Mrs. Carter's arrival at the Beaver Valley Hospital, which was a direct and 
proximate cause of her wrongful death.2 (R. 5) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
An automotive mechanic does not provide care and service in any way similar to 
physicians, nurses, therapists, etc., and is not a health care provider under the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act. An action against a hospital engaging the services of an automotive mechanic 
steps beyond its protected role as a "malpractice action against a health care provider" 
contemplated by the statute, as all facets of hospital operation do not and should not be construed 
to be providing health care under the Act. 
1
 When bringing this action, Plaintiff complied with the statute of limitations imposed by 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-13 to -15 (1998). 
2
 Although Defendant submitted an Affidavit disputing such facts, they are not "materiar 
to a determination of the Statute of Limitations issue as to whether the automobile mechanic is a 
health care provider. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(r). Ct. Heglar Ranch, Inc. v. Stillman, 619 P.2d 
1390, 1391 (Utah 1980) (summary judgment can be granted on undisputed material facts, even if 




AUTO MECHANICS DO NOT PROVIDE CARE OR SERVICE SIMILAR 
TO PHYSICIANS, NURSES, ETC., AND ARE NOT A HEALTH CARE 
PROVIDERS UNDER THE UTAH HEALTHCARE MALPRACTICE ACT 
At issue is whether the definition of "health care provider" reaches to include an auto 
mechanic's work on an ambulance. The applicable definition is specifically articulated in 
Section 78-14-3 of the Utah Code: 
(11) "Health care provider" includes any person, partnership, association, 
corporation, or other facility or institution who causes to be rendered or who 
renders health care or professional services as a hospital, physician, registered 
nurse, licensed practical nurse, nurse-midwife, dentist, dental hygienist, 
optometrist, clinical laboratory technologist, pharmacist, physical therapist, 
podiatric physician, psychologist, chiropractic physician, naturopathic physician, 
osteopathic physician, osteopathic physician and surgeon, audiologist, 
speech-language pathologist, clinical social worker, certified social worker, social 
service worker, marriage and family counselor, practitioner of obstetrics, or 
others rendering similar care and services relating to or arising out of the 
health needs of persons or groups of persons and officers, employees, or 
agents of any of the above acting in the course and scope of their 
employment. [Emphasis added.] 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3(11)(1998). 
Of course one does not find ambulance auto mechanic articulated among the specifically 
identified providers. If it is to be found, it must somehow be included as one of the "others 
rendering similar services . . . " clause. Instructing how to apply this clause, the Utah Supreme 
Court in Platts v. Parents Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 658, 663 (Utah 1997), pointed out that 
"[T]he statute does not address the similarity of titles, but rather the similarity of care and 
services/' 
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There is no room practically or technically to question how a physician, nurse, dentist, 
pharmacist or therapist, etc., provides for the health needs of persons. Yet, by any view, it seems 
unfathomable how one could include an automotive mechanic among their ranks. 
Even assuming that a mechanic is employed full time by a hospital3, is the mechanic 
protected by the statute when he has worked on an ambulance and it breaks down in route? Or 
on the administrator's company car when it catches fire and burns him badly? Or on the 
hospital's garbage truck when its brakes fail and it runs a red light killing several in a minivan? 
Perhaps its approach was flawed or the construction too narrow, but the Utah Court of 
Appeals took well the point that those attempting to apply — or those thinking that the statute 
just logically could not apply — need to know what procedural course they should take before 
pursuing an action. See Platts v. Parents Helping Parents, 897 P.2d 1228, 1231-32,(Utah Ct. 
App. 1995), rev'dby Platts v. Parents Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 658 (Utah 1997). 
Early in its analysis, the Utah Supreme Court aptly points out: 
In matters of statutory construction, "[t]he best evidence of the true intent 
and purpose of the Legislature in enacting [an] Act is the plain language of the 
Act. . . . "Statutory enactments are to render all parts thereof relevant and 
meaningful. . . ." Likewise we are compelled to give the statutory language 
meaning and to assume that "each term in the statute was used advisedly . . . 
unless such a reading is unreasonably confused or inoperable." [Emphasis 
added.] 
Platts 947 P.2d at 662. (citations omitted)(quoting Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 
679 P.2d 903. 906 (Utah 1984); Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp., 609 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1980); 
Savage Industries., Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 811 P.2d 664, 670 (Utah 1991). 
If ''plain language" within an Act is regarded as best evidence of meaning; if the analysis 
1
 There is no dispute, of course, that when providing health care Defendant is a health 
care provider under Section 78-14-3(11). 
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is to come away with something relevant and meaningful; if unreasonably confused or inoperable 
readings are to be avoided— how is it possible that the statute in question is not ambiguous, 
where a trial court can construe an ambulance mechanic to be a health care provider and that 
common negligence in routine mechanical maintenance can be viewed as "medical malpractice/* 
when it is so patently contrary to the plain meaning of the terms and their common relevance? 
Because of the ambiguity and license for extremely broad construction, normally could not, an 
even very sophisticated potential plaintiff logically be better informed as to what action to pursue 
when advancing a claim." Platts v. Parents Helping Parents, 897 P.2d 228, 1232,(Utah Ct. App. 
1995), rev'd by Platts v. Parents Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 658 (Utah 1997). 
The Supreme Court's answer was that "whether [the one providing a service does] indeed 
qualify as a 'health care provider' depends, of course, upon whether the . . . service actually 
rendered [is] in fact similar to the care and services rendered by any of those specifically listed in 
the statute." Id. at 663. 
Applying this analysis, the question becomes whether an automotive mechanic working 
on an ambulance provides services arising out of the health needs of persons or groups of persons 
in any way plainly or meaningfully similar to those of a physician, registered nurse, dentist, 
optometrist, or clinical laboratory technologist or anyone employed by or acting for them in 
rendering such care or service. To say that it does simply must go well beyond any reasonable 
intent the legislature could have had in setting out the specifics of the statute. 
The trial court's conclusion that an auto mechanic is a health care provider simply 
because she is an employee of a hospital is plainly and practically wrong. No one using plain 
meanings could place the services of a mechanic on par with those of a physician or therapist in 
asserting negligence and applicable standards of care. Common sense would say that there is not 
even an issue of fact; a mechanic is not a health care provider and alleging malpractice regarding 
6 
a mechanic's care or service cannot be done in good faith. Nevertheless, the technical inquiry 
urged by the Utah Supreme Court in its version of Platts at a minimum raises an issue of 
material fact upon which the trial court wrongfully granted summary judgment. 
POINT TWO 
SINCE PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM DOES NOT ARISE FROM HEALTH CARE 
PROVIDED BY DEFENDANT, IT IS NOT A "MALPRACTICE IN 
ACTION AGAINST A HEALTH CARE PROVIDER" 
Even assuming that this court determines that the Defendant "wears only one hat", there is 
still at least a question of fact as to whether this action is a "malpractice action against a health 
care provider" as that term is defined under Section 78-14-3(14) of the Utah Code. 
"Malpractice action against a health care provider" means any action 
against a health care provider whether in contract, tort, breach of warranty, 
wrongful death, or otherwise, based upon alleged personal injuries relating to or 
arising out of health care rendered or which should have been rendered by the 
health care provider. [Emphasis added] 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3(14)(1998). 
In the instant case, although there is no dispute that Defendant ordinarily acts as a "health 
care provider", it seems that the maintenance and repair of an ambulance by an auto mechanic is 
in no way related to or arising from "health care." Accordingly, even though Defendant is a 
"health care provider" when it is "wearing its auto mechanic hat" through its employees it is not 
entitled to the protections of the Malpractice Act. 
CONCLUSION 
The mechanical condition of an ambulance and the pertinent negligence of its automotive 
mechanic are not matters of medical malpractice. The Utah Medical Malpractice cannot be read 
so broadly as to protect such negligence of an ambulance mechanic or the hospital for which his 
services are rendered. These are matters of ordinary care and general liability and this Court 
should so conclude. 
7 
The summary judgment entered by the trial court should accordingly be reversed and 
remanded for further proceedings. 





I certify that I mailed a true and complete copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
APPELLANT, by first-class mail, with postage fully prepaid t h i s g ' ^ a a y of July, 1999, to: 
M. Dayle Jeffs The Utah Court of Appeals 
JEFFS & JEFFS Scott M. Matheson Court House 
90 North 100 East 450 South State Street 
P. O. Box 888 P- O. Box 140230 
Provo, Utah 84603 Salt Lake City, Utah 84721 -0230 
8 
547 JUDICIAL CODE 78-14-2 
where any of th<3 parties resides or service is had, subject, 
however, to the power of the court to change the place of trial 
as provided by law. 1953 
7^-13-8. Change of venue — Condit ions precedent . 
If the county in which the action is commenced is not the 
proper county for the trial thereof, the action may neverthe-
less be tried therein, unless the defendant at the time he 
answers or otherwise appears files a motion, in writing, that 
the trial be had in the proper county. 1953 
78-13-9. Grounds. 
The court nay , on motion, change the place of trial in the 
following cases: 
(1) whtjn the county designated in the complaint is not 
the proper county; 
(2) when chere is reason to believe that an impartial 
trial cannot be had in the county, city, or precinct desig-
nated in rJie complaint; 
(3) when the convenience of witnesses and the ends of 
justice would be promoted by the change; 
(4) when all the parties to an action, by stipulation or 
by consent in open court entered in the minutes, agree 
that the place of trial may be changed to another county. 
Thereupcn the court must order the change as agreed 
upon . 1953 
711-13-10. Court to which transfer is to be made. 
If any action or proceeding is commenced or is pending in a 
court and the court orders the place of trial to be changed, it 
must be transferred for trial to a court the parties may agree 
u;:>on by stipulation in writing or made in open court and 
entered in the minutes, or if they do not so agree, then to the 
nearest court where like objection or cause fcr making the 
order does no; exist. 1953 
73-13-13.. Duty of clerk — Fees and costs — Effect on 
jurisdict ion. 
When an oi der is made transferring an action or proceeding 
fcr trial, the court must transmit the pleadings and papers 
therein to the ccurt to which it is transferred. The costs and 
fees therefor and filing the papers anew must be paid by the 
p i r ty at whose instance the order was made; provided, that 
when such order is made for the reason that the cause was 
commenced in the wrong county, the costs of transfer and 
filing the papers anew shall be paid by the plaintiff in the 
action within ten days after the making of such order, or said 
cause shall be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The court to 
which ar action or proceeding is transferred shall have and 
e cercise the same jurisdiction as if it had been originally 
commenced t.ierein. 1953 
CHAPTER 14 








Short title of act. 
Legislative findings and declarations — Pur-
pose of act. 
Definitions. 
Statute of limitations — Exceptions — Appli-
cation. 
Amount of award reduced by amounts of col-
lateral sources available to plaintiff — No 
reduction where subrogation right exists — 
Collateral sources defined — Procedure to 
preserve subrogation rights — Evidence ad-
missible — Exceptions. 
Failure to obtain informed consent — Proof 
Section 
required of patient — Defenses — Consent to 
health care. 
78-14-6. Writing required as basis for liability for 
breach of guarantee, warranty, contract or 
assurance of result. 
78-14-7. Ad damnum clause prohibited in complaint. 
78-14-7.1. Limitation of award of noneconomi: damages 
in malpractice actions. 
78-14-7.5. Limitation on attorney's contingency fee in 
malpractice action. 
78-14-8. Notice of intent to commence actior. 
78-14-9. Professional liability insurance coverage for 
providers — Insurance commissioner may 
require joint underwriting authority. 
78-14-9.5. Periodic payment of future damages in mal-
practice actions. 
78-14-10. Actions under Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act. 
78-14-11. Act not retroactive — Exception. 
78-14-12. Division to provide panel — Exemption — 
Procedures — Statute of limitations tolled — 
Composition of panel — Expenses — Divi-
sion authorized to set license fees. 
78-14-13. Proceedings — Authority of panel — Rights of 
parties to proceedings. 
78-14-14. Decision and recommendations of panel — No 
judicial or other review. 
78-14-15. Evidence of proceedings not admissible in sub-
sequent action — Panelist may ro t be com-
pelled to testify — Immunity of panelist from 
civil liability — Information regarding pro-
fessional conduct. 
78-14-16. Proceedings considered a binding arbitration 
hearing upon written agreement of parties 
— Compensation to members of panel. 
78-14-1. Short t it le of act. 
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Utah 
Health Care Malpractice Act." 1976 
78-14-2. Legislative findings and declarat ions — Pur-
pose of act. 
The legislature finds and declares tha t the numoer of suits 
and claims for damages and the amount of judgments and 
settlements arising from health care has increased greatly in 
recent years. Because of these increases the insurance indus-
try has substantially increased the costj)f medical malpractice 
insurance. The effect of increased insurance premiums and 
Increased claims is increased health care cost, bcth through 
the health care providers passing the cost of prem.ums to the 
patient and through the provider's practicing defe ".sive medi-
cine because he views a patient as a potential ad\e:rsary in a 
lawsuit. Further, certain health care providers sre discour-
aged from continuing to provide services because of the high 
cost and possible unavailability of malpractice insurance. 
In view of these recent trends and with the intention of 
alleviating the adverse effects which these trends are produc-
ing in the public's health care system, it is necessary to protect 
the public interest by enacting measures designed to encour-
age private insurance^companies. to continue to ,.provide 
health-related malpractice insurance while at the same t ime 
establishing a mechanism to ensure trie availability of insur-
ance 'in the event that it becomes unavailable from private 
companies. 
In enacting this act, it is the purpose of the le ^islature to 
provide a reasonable time in which actions may be commenced 
against health care providers while limiting that time to a 
specific period for which professional liability insurance pre-
78-14-3 JUDICIAL CODE 548 
miums can be reasonably and accurately calculated; and to 
provide other procedural changes to expedite early evaluation 
and settlement of claims. 1976 
78-14-3. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Audiologist" means a person licensed to practice 
audiology under 'Pitie 58, Chapter 41, Speech-language 
Pathology and Audiology Licensing Act. 
(2) "Certified social worker" means a person licensed to 
practice as a certified social worker under Section 58-60-
305. 
(S) "Chiropractic physician" means a person licensed to 
practice chiropractic under Title 58, Chapter 73, Chiro-
practic Physician Practice Act. 
(4) "Clinical social worker" means a person licensed to 
practice as a clinical social worker under Section 58-60-
305 
(5) "Commissioner" means the commissioner of insur-
ance as provided in Section 31A-2-102. 
(6) "Dental hyg"jenist" means a person licensed to prac-
tice dental hygiene as defined in Section 58-69-102. 
(7) "Dentist" means a person licensed to practice den-
tistry as defined in Section 58-69-102. 
(8) "Division" means the Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing created in Section 58-1-103. 
(9) "Future damages" includes damages for future 
medical treatment, care or custody, loss of future earn-
ings, loss of bodily function, or future pain and suffering of 
the judgment creditor. 
(10) "Health care" means any act or treatment per-
formed or furnished, or which should have been per-
formed or furnished, by any health care provider for, to, or 
on behalf of a p a t e n t during the patient's medical care, 
treatment, or confinement. 
(11) "Health care provider" includes any person, part-
nership, association, corporation, or other facility or insti-
tution who causes to be rendered or who renders health 
care or professional services as a hospital, physician, 
registered nurse, licensed practical nurse, nurse-midwife, 
dentist, dental hy^ienist, optometrist, clinical laboratory 
technologist, pharmacist, physical therapist, ppdiatric 
physician, psychologist, chiropractic physician, naturo-
pathic physician, osteopathic physician, osteopathic phy-
sician and surgeon, audiologist, speech-language patholo-
gist, clinical social worker, certified social worker, social 
service worker, marriage and family counselor, practitio-
ner of obstetrics, or others rendering similar care and 
services relating to or arising out of the health needs of 
persons or groups of persons and officers, employees, or 
agents of any of the above acting in the course and scope 
of their employment. 
(12) "Hospital" means a public or private institution 
licensed under Title 26, Chapter 21, Health Care Facility 
Licensing and Inspection Act. 
(13) "Licensed practical nurse" means a person licensed 
to practice as a licensed practical nurse as provided in 
Section 58-31b-301. 
(14) "Malpractice action against a health care pro-
vider" means any action against a health care provider, 
whether in contract, tort, breach of warranty, wrongful 
death, or otherwise, based upon alleged personal injuries 
relating to of arising out of health care^rendered or which 
should have been rendered by the health care provider. 
(15) "Marriage and family therapist" means a person 
licensed to practice as a marriage therapist or family 
therapist under Section 58-60-405. 
(16) "Naturopathic physician" means a person licensed 
to practice naturopathy as defined in Section 58-71-102. 
(17) "Nurse-midwife" means a person licensed to en-
gage in practice as a nurse midwife under Section 58-44 a-
301. 
(18) "Optometrist" means a person licensed to practice 
optometry under Title 58, Chapter 16a, Utah Optometry 
Practice Act. 
(19) "Osteopathic physician" means a person licensed 
to practice osteopathy under Title 58, Chapter 68, Utah 
Osteopathic Medical Practice Act. 
(20) "Patient" means a person who is under the care of 
a health care provider, under a contract, express or 
implied. 
(21) "Pharmacist" means a person licensed to practi:e 
pharmacy as provided in Section 58-17a-301. 
(22) "Physical therapist" means a person licensed to 
practice physical therapy under Title 53, Chapter 24a, 
Physical Therapist Practice Act. 
(23) "Physician" means a person licensed to practi:e 
medicine and surgery under Title 58, Chapter 67, Utr.h 
Medical Practice Act. 
(24) "Podiatric physician" means a person licensed to 
practice podiatry under Title 58, Chapter 5a, Podiatric 
Physician Licensing Act. 
(25) "Practitioner of obstetrics" means a person li-
censed to practice as a physician in this state under Title 
58, Chapter 67, Utah Medical Practice Act, or under Title 
58, Chapter 68, Utah Osteopathic Medical Practice Act. 
(26) "Psychologist" means a person licensed under Title 
58, Chapter 61, Psychologist Licensing Act, to practice 
psychology as defined in Section 58-61-102. 
(27) "Registered nurse" means a person licensed to 
practice professional nursing as provided in Section 58-
31b-301. 
(28) "Representative" means the spouse, parent, guard-
ian, trustee, attorney-in-fact, or other legal agent of the 
patient. 
(29) "Social service worker" means a person licensed to 
practice as a social service worker under Section 58-60-
305. 
(30) "Speech-language pathologist" means a person li-
censed to practice speech-language pathology under Tike 
58, Chapter 41, Speech-language Pathology and Audiol-
ogy Licensing Act. 
(31) "Tort" means any legal wrong, breach of duty, cr 
negligent or unlawful act or omission proximately causing 
injury or damage to another. 19£8 
78-14-4. Statute of l imitat ions — Except ions — Appli-
cation. 
(1) No malpractice action against a health care provider 
may be brought unless it is commenced within two years after 
the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use cf 
reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury, which-
ever first occurs, but not to exceed four years after the date cf 
the alleged act, omission, neglect or occurrence, except that: 
(a) In an action where the allegation against the health 
care provider is that a foreign object has been wrongfully 
left within a patient's body, the claim shall be barred 
unless commenced within one year after the plaintiff or 
patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable dili-
gence should have discovered, the existence of the foreign 
object wrongfully left in the patient's body, whichever first 
occurs; and 
(b) In an action where it is alleged that a patient has 
been prevented from discovering misconduct on the part 
of a health care provider because that health care pro-
vider has affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal the 
alleged misconduct, the claim shall be barred unless 
commenced within one year after the plaintiff or patient 
discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence, 
78-2-3 JUDICIAL CODE 
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review 
of informal adjudicative proceedings of agencies under 
Subsection (e); 
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record 
holding a statute of the United States or this state 
unconstitutional on its face under the Constitution of the 
United States or the Utah Constitution; 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in-
volving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction 
of a first degree or capital felony; 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of 
record over which the Court of Appeals does not have 
original appellate jurisdiction; and 
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments, 
or decrees ruling on legislative subpoenas. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Ap-
peals any of the matters over which the Supreme Court has 
original appellate jurisdiction, except: 
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an inter-
locutory order of a court of record involving a charge of a 
capital felony; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and 
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) 
through (d). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or 
denying a petition for writ of certiorari for the review of a 
Court of Appeals adjudication, but the Supreme Court shall 
review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals under 
Subsection (3)(b). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements 
of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its review of agency adjudicative 
proceedings. 1996 
78-2-3. Repealed. 1986 
78-2-4. Supreme Court — Rulemaking, judges pro tem-
pore, and practice of law. 
(1) The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and 
evidence for use in the courts of the state and shall by rule 
manage the appellate process. The Legislature may amend 
the rules of procedure and evidence adopted by the Supreme 
Court upon a vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses 
of the Legislature. 
(2) Except as otherwise provided by the Utah Constitution, 
the Supreme Court by rule may authorize retired justices and 
judges and judges pro tempore to perform any judicial duties. 
Judges pro tempore shall be citizens of the United States, 
Utah residents, and admitted to practice law in Utah. 
(3) The Supreme Court shall by rule govern the practice of 
law, including admission to practice law and the conduct and 
discipline of persons admitted to the practice of law. 1986 
78-2-5. Repealed. 1988 
78-2-6. Appellate court administrator. 
The appellate court administrator shall appoint clerks and 
support staff as necessary for the operation of the Supreme 
Court and the Court of Appeals. The duties of the clerks and 
support staff shall be established by the appellate court 
administrator, and powers established by rule of the Supreme 
C o u r t . 1986 
78-2-7. Repealed. 1986 
78-2-7.5. Service of sheriff to court. 
The court may at any time require the attendance and 
services of any sheriff in the state. 1988 
78-2-8 to 78-2-14. Repealed. lsss, 1988 
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78-2a-l. Creation — Seal. 
There is created a court known as the Court of Appe 
Court of Appeals is a court of record and shall have i 
78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Funct 
Fil ing fees. 
(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges. T 
of appointment to office as a judge of the Court of Ap 
until the first general election held more than thre 
after the effective date of the appointment. Tht;real 
term of office of a judge of the- Court of Appeals is six ye 
commences on the first Monday in January, next follo\ 
date of election. A judge whose term expiree may sen 
request of the Judicial Council, until a successor s ap 
and qualified. The presiding judge of the Cour; of 
shall receive as additional compensation $1,000 per ai 
fraction thereof for the period served. 
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sic and render ;udg 
panels of three judges. Ass.igi merit to panels shal 
random rotation of all judges of the Cour: of Appe; 
Court of Appeals by rule shall provide for the select 
chair for each panel. The Court of Appeals may not sit < 
(3) The judges of the Court o: Appeals shall e.ect a 
ing judge from among the members of the court by i 
vote of all judges. The term of crfice of the oresiding^ 
two years and until a successor :s elected. A presicing\ 
the Court of Appeals may ser/e in that office no mc re t: 
successive terms. The Court of Appeals may oy rule pre 
an acting presiding judge to serve in the absence or inc 
of the presiding judge. 
(4) The presiding judge may oe removed from the 
presiding judge by majority vote of all judges of the ( 
Appeals. In addition to the duties of a jud^e of the C 
Appeals, the presiding judge shall: 
(a) administer the rot.aticn and scheduling of p 
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court; 
(c) call and preside over the meetings of t i e C 
Appeals; and 
(d) carry out duties prescribed b}r the Sup :em< 
and the Judicial Council 
(5) Filing fees for the Court o:Appeals are the sam. 
the Supreme Court. 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals j u r i s d i c t i o n . 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue 
traordinary writs and to issue all writs and process nee 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, i 
crees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals h i s appellate jurisdiction, 
ing jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the fina. orders and decrees resulting from 
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appea 
the district court review of ir.formal adjudicative p 
ings of the agencies, except the Public Service C< 
sion, State Tax Commission, Sohoo. and Iastit 
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78-2a-l. Creat ion — Seal. 
There is created a court known as the Court of Appeals. The 
Court of Appeals is a court of record and shall have a seal. 
1986 
78-2a-2. >Fumber of judges — Terms — Funct ions — 
Fi l ing fees. 
(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges. The term 
of appointment to office as a judge of the Court of Appeals is 
until the first general election held more than three years 
after the effective date of the appointment. Thereafter, the 
term of office of a judge of the Court of Appeals is six years and 
commences on the first Monday in January, next following the 
date of election. A judge whose term expires may serve, upon 
request of the Judicial Council, until a successor is appointed 
and qualified. The presiding judge of the Court of Appeals 
shall receive as additional compensation $1,000 per annum or 
fraction thereof for the period served. 
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judgment in 
panels of three judges. Assignment to panels shall be by 
random rotation of all judges of the Court of Appeals. The 
Court of Appeals by rule shall provide for the selection of a 
chair for each panel. The Court of Appeals may not sit en banc. 
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a presid-
ing judge from among the members of the court by majority 
vote of all judges. The term of office of the presiding judge is 
two years and until a successor is elected. A presiding judge of 
the Court of Appeals may serve in that office no more than two 
successive terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for 
an acting presiding judge to serve in the absence or incapacity 
of the presiding judge. 
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the office of 
presiding juc ge by majority vote of all judges of the Court of 
Appeals. In addition to the duties of a judge, of the Court of 
Appeals, the presiding judge shall: 
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels; 
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court: 
(c) caL and preside over the meetings of the Court of 
Appeals; and 
(d) cairy out duties prescribed by the Supreme Court 
and the Judicial Council. 
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the same as for 
the Supreme Court. 1988 
78-2a-o. Court of Appeals jurisdict ion. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all ex-
traordinary writs and to issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and de-
crees; or 
(b) in cdd of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, includ-
ing jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals from 
the district court review of informal adjudicative proceed-
ings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commis-
sion, Sta;e Tax Commission, School and Institutional 
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire 
483 
JUDICIA 
and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive direc-
tor of the Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, 
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political 
subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 
63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in 
criminal cases, except those involving a charge of a first 
degree or capital felony; 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a conviction of a first degree or 
capital felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary 
writs sought by persons who are incarcerated or serving 
any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting 
a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a f rst 
degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordi-
nary writs challenging the decisions of the Board of 
Pardons and Parole except in cares involving a f rst 
degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic rela-
tions cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, annul-
ment, property division, child custody, support, visitation, 
adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; a n i 
(j) cases transferred to the Courz of Appeals from the 
Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its owi motion only and by 
the vote of four judges of the court may certiry to the Supreme 
Court for original appellate review and determination any 
matter over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate 
jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the require-
ments of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Acimi oistrative Procedures 
Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 1996 
78-2a-4. Rev iew of act ions by Supreme .Court. 
Review of the judgments, orders, and decrees of the Court of 
Appeals shall be by petition for writ, of certiorari to the 
Supreme Court. 1986 
78-2a-5. Locat ion of Court of Appeals . 
The Court of Appeals has its principal location in Salt Lake 
City. The Court of Appeals may perform any of its functions in 




Term of judges — Vacancy. 
Jurisdiction —Appeals. 
Repealed. 
Terms — Minimum of once quarterly. 
1-11. Repealed. 
State District Court Administrative System. 
Repealed. 
Costs of system. 
Repealed. 
Transfer of court operating responsibilities -
Facilities — Staff— Budget. 
3-14. Repealed. 
District court case mar .agernent. 
Allocation of district co irt leas and forfei.ure; 
Section 














(33-30-13 STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL 
before the expiration )f any extension of time granted under 
Section 63-30-11, regardless of whether or not the function 
giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental. 
1998 
63-30-13. C la im a g a i n s t po l i t i ca l subd iv i s ion o r i t s em-
p loyee — T ime for filing no t i ce . 
A claim against a political subdivision, or against its em-
ployee for an act or omission occurring during the performance 
of the employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or 
under color of authority, is barred unless notice, of claim is filed 
with the governing body of the political subdivision according 
to the requirements of Section 63-30-11 within one year after 
the claim arises, or before the expiration of any extension of 
time granted under Section 63-30-11, regardless of whether or 
not the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as 
governmental. 1998 
6-3-30-14. C la im for i n j u r y — A p p r o v a l o r d e n i a l by 
g o v e r n m e n t a l e n t i t y o r i n s u r a n c e c a r r i e r 
w i t h i n n i n e t y d a y s . 
Within ninety days of the filing of a claim the governmental 
entity or its insurance carrier shall act thereon and notify the 
claimant in writing of its approval or denial. A claim shall be 
deemed to have been denied if at the end of the ninety-day 
period the governmental entity or its insurance carrier has 
failed to approve or deny the claim. 1965 
63-30-15. D e n i a l of c l a im for i n j u r y — A u t h o r i t y a n d 
t i m e for filing a c t i o n a g a i n s t g o v e r n m e n t a l 
en t i ty . 
(1) If the claim is denied, a claimant may institute an action 
in the district court against the governmental entity or an 
employee of the entity. 
(2) The claimant shall begin the action within one year 
after denial of the claim or within one year after the denial 
period specified in this chapter has expired, regardless of 
whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is charac-
terized as governmental. 1987 
63-30-16. J u r i s d i c t i o n of d i s t r i c t c o u r t s ove r a c t i o n s — 
A p p l i c a t i o n of R u l e s of Civil P r o c e d u r e . 
The district courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction 
over any action brought under this chapter, and such actions 
sliall be governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in so 
far as they are consistent with this chapter. 1983 
63-30-17. V e n u e of a c t i o n s . 
Actions against the .state may be brought in the county in 
which the claim arose or in Salt Lake County. Actions against 
a county may be brought in the county in which the claim 
arose, or in the defendant county, or, upon leave granted by a 
district court judge of the defendant county, in any county 
contiguous to the defendant county. Leave may be granted ex 
parte. Actions against all other political subdivisions including 
cities and towns, shall be brought in the county in which the 
political subdivision is located or in the county in which the 
claim arose. 1983 
63-30-18. C o m p r o m i s e a n d s e t t l e m e n t of a c t i ons . 
(1) A political subdivision, after conferring with its legal 
officer or other legal counsel if it does not have a legal officer, 
may compromise and settle any action as to the damages or 
other relief sought. 
(2) The risk manager in the Department of Administrative 
Services may: 
(a) compromise and settle any claim of $25,000 or less 
in damages filed against the state for which the Risk 
Management Fund may be liable; 
(b) with the concurrence of the attorney general or his 
representative and the executive director of the Depart-
ment of Administrative Services, compromise and s M 
any claim of $25,000 to $100,000 in damages for w h i $ i l 
Risk Management Fund may be liable; and 
(3) The risk manager shall comply with procedures Mk 
requirements of Title 63, Chapter 38b, in compromising fH 
settling any claim of $100,000 or more. 
63-30-19. U n d e r t a k i n g r e q u i r e d of plaint iff in acfci<jffl 
At the time of filing the action the plaintiff shall fijsffl 
undertaking in a sum fixed by the court, but in no case QB 
than the sum of $300, conditioned upon payment by | 1 
plaintiff of taxable costs incurred by the governmental | M 
in the action if the plaintiff fails to prosecute the action or ffll 
to recover judgment. 
63-30-20. J u d g m e n t a g a i n s t g o v e r n m e n t a l entity b!B 
a c t i o n a g a i n s t emp loyee . 
Judgment against a governmental entity in an acijjfl 
brought under this act shall constitute a complete bar to ffl 
action by the claimant, by reason of the same subject maffl 
against the employee whose act or omission gave rise tC §§ 
claim. 
63-30-21. R e p e a l e d . 
63-30-22. E x e m p l a r y o r p u n i t i v e d a m a g e s prohiti ;J| | 
— G o v e r n m e n t a l e n t i t y e x e m p t from exeflfi 
t i on , a t t a c h m e n t , o r g a r n i s h m e n t . 
(1) (a) No judgment may be rendered against the gotell 
mental entity for exemplary or punitive damages. 
(b) The state shall pay any judgment or portion of $11 
judgment entered against a state employee in the.empljffl 
ee's personal capacity even if the judgment is fovM 
includes exemplary or punitive damages if the Etjjl 
would be required to pay the judgment under Sectlffl 
63-30-36 or 63-30-37. 
(2) Execution, attachment, or garnishment may not i^H 
against a governmental entity. 
63-30-23. P a y m e n t of c la im o r j u d g m e n t against s:aH 
— P r e s e n t m e n t for p a y m e n t . 
Any claim approved by the state as defined by Subsectlj 
63-30-2(1) or any final judgment obtained against the stjH 
shall be presented to the state risk manager, or to the offfl 
agency, institution or other instrumentality involved for:;™ 
ment, if payment by said instrumentality is otherwise pei^lfj 
ted by law. If such payment is not authorized by law then sgl 
judgment or claim shall be presented to the hoard of exaiJI 
ers and the board shall proceed as provided in Section 63-6-H 
63-30-24. P a y m e n t of c l a im o r j u d g m e n t agains t poltji 
ca l subd iv i s ion — P r o c e d u r e by g o v e r n ^ 
body. H 
Any claim approved by a political subdivision or any f.ffl| 
judgment obtained against a political subdivision shall|H 
submitted to the governing body thereof to be paid forthv/lfll 
from the general funds of said political subdivision unless-sffl 
funds are appropriated to some other use or restricted by l | | 
or contract for other purposes. 
63-30-25. P a y m e n t of c l a im o r j u d g m e n t agains t poffl 
ca l s u b d i v i s i o n — I n s t a l l m e n t payments , jfj 
If the subdivision is unable to pay the claim or award dm'M 
the current fiscal year it may pay the claim or award iifnjl 
more than ten ensuing annual installments of equal size 0:i| 
such other installments as are agreeable to the claimant- H 
63-30-26. R e s e r v e funds for p a y m e n t of c la ims or pi|fl 
c h a s e of i n s u r a n c e c r e a t e d by poli t ical sulffl 
v i s ions . 
Any political subdivision may create and maintain a reseffl 
fund or may jointly with one or more other political subdifH 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR BEAVER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MAX R. CARTER, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
BEAVER COUNTY and MILFORD 
VALLEY MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, a 
governmental agency of BEAVER COUNTY, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Civil No. 980500056 
Judge J. Philip Eves 
This case came before the court on a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant 
Milford Valley Memorial Hospital on May 26, 1998. A Reply Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment was also filed by Defendant on September 2, 1998. On 
November 23, 1998 Plaintiflf filed his Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to 
Summary Judgment and Request for Oral .Argument. Oral argument on the Motion occurred on 
December 16, 1998. 
Having reviewed the Parties' Memoranda and Affidavits, having heard oral argument, and 
having reviewed relevant Utah law, the court now rules as follows: 
FACTS 
CJ.A. Rule 4-501(2)(B) provides that: 
The points and authorities in opposition to a motion for summary judgment shall 
begin with a section that contains a concise statement of material facts as to which the 
party contends a genuine issue exists. Each disputed fact shall be stated in separate 
numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions of the record upon 
which the opposing party relies, and, if applicable, shall state the numbered sentence or 
sentences of the movants facts that are disputed. All material facts set forth in the 
movant's statement and properly supported by an accurate reference to the record shall 
be deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically 
controverted by the opposing party's statement. 
In his Memorandum of Points and Authorities and Opposition to Summary Judgment and 
Request for Oral Argument, Plaintiff fails to provide any such "concise statement of material 
facts as to which [it] contends a genuine issue exists." Nor does he "specifically refer" to any 
portion of the record to demonstrate disputed issues of fact. However, Defendant Milford 
Valley Memorial Hospital supports its motion with affidavits and exhibits containing statements of 
fact which are in substantial compliance with CIA. Rule 4-501(2)(B). Consequently, Milford 
Valley's facts are deemed to be admitted for the purpose of this motion. However, pursuant to 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(b) and the case law surrounding it, the Court shall view these purported facts 
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, asking whether a genuine issue of material 
fact exists that must be resolved by a finder of fact. £es praper City v. Estate of Bernando, 888 
P.2d 1097,1099 (Utah 1995); Ron Shepherd Ins. Inc v Shields. 882 P.2d 650, 654 (Utah 1994); 
Utah Pept, Qf Environmental Quality v, Wind River Petroleum, 881 P.2d 869, 872 (Utah 1994); 
Holbrook v. Adams. 542 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975). In relevant part, the undisputed facts of this 
case can be summarized as follows: 
On October 8, 1995, Anna Rae Carter, a resident of Minersville, Utah, became ill and 
distressed. Her husband, Max R. Carter, the plaintiff in this action, called for emergency 
assistance from Milford Valley Memorial Hospital. An ambulance was dispatched. Upon its 
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arrival in Minersvilie, Mrs. Carter was placed inside and the ambulance departed for the Beaver 
Valley Hospital. However, due to the "erratic" operation of a gauge within the ambulance, a 
second ambulance was sent from Beaver Valley to meet the Milford Ambulance en route. When 
the two ambulances met, Mrs. Carter was transferred to the Beaver ambulance, which took a 
minute or two. Ms. Carter then continued her journey to the Beaver Valley Hospital. See 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, at pp. 2-3. Neither ambulance 
actually ever became immobile or ceased to function. 
Mrs. Carter subsequently died on October 17, 1998. Id. 
Approximately 2 1/3 years later, Plaintiff filed a complaint in this action, alleging that 
Defendant's negligent care and maintenance of the ambulance caused the delay of Mrs. Carter's 
arrival at the Beaver Valley Hospital, which in turn caused her wrongful death. Li pp. 1-2. 
Defendant Milford Valley Memorial Hospital Ambulance Service is owned and operated 
by Defendant Milford Valley Memorial Hospital. Milford Valley Memorial Hospital was duly 
created as a separate body politic under the Utah Special Service District Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 
17A-2-1301, et seq.. Milford Valley Hospital is also licensed as a "General Acute Hospital" 
pursuant to §26-21-2. Id. 
ANALYSIS 
Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs claim is barred by the two year statute of limitations 
contained in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, as well as the general two year statute of 
limitations for wrongful death. Defendant also argues that Plaintiffs claim is barred by the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. 
In response, Plaintiff asserts that the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act is inapplicable to 
the present case since the suit is not for medical malpractice, but is for negligent in the 
3 
maintenance of the ambulance originally sent to transport Ms. Carter. The plaintiff agrees, 
however, "that if the Medical Malpractice Act is applicable, his claim should be barred." See 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities and Opposition to Summary Judgment and Request for 
Oral Argument, at pp. 2-4. Plaintiff also argues that the general statute of limitations for 
wrongful death does not apply to his case, nor does the Governmental Immunity Act bar his 
present case because his "claims do not arise out of the operation of an emergency vehicle," and 
"do not arise from a negligent inspection or failure thereof." M- at pp. 4-7. 
The statute of limitations contained in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, found in 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(1), provides in relevant part that: 
No malpractice action against a health care provider may be brought unless it is 
commenced within two years after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of 
reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury, which ever first occurs, but not to 
exceed four years after the date of the alleged act, omission, neglect or occurrence . . . . 
The statute defines a health care provider as "any person, partnership, association, corporation, 
or other facility . . . who renders health care or professional services as a hospital . . . ." See 
§ 78-14-3(11). The statute also defines a malpractice action against a health care provider as 
Many action against a health care provider whether in contract, tort, breach of warranty, 
wrongful death, or otherwise, based upon alleged personal injuries relating to or arising out of 
health care rendered or which should have been rendered by the health care provider." £g£ § 
78-14-3(14), 
In the present case, the defendant easily qualifies as a health care provider for purposes 
of the Malpractice Act. The defendant is a hospital which renders health care and related 
professional services. And, on October 8, 1995, the defendant provided such health care and 
related professional service to Mrs. Carter through its ambulance operations. Transportation 
of persons in need of health care to the hospital is obviously an integral part of the hospital 
4 
function and is part of the health care provided by the defendant. Indeed, the health care 
service which the defendant provided through its ambulance is the very issue in this case. 
In addition, the action also qualifies as a malpractice suit for purposes of the Act, in 
that the plaintiff complains of the standard of service provided by defendant in the delayed 
arrival of Mrs. Carter at the hospital. Defendant's claim meets the definition of a malpractice 
action as defined by § 78-14-4(1) because it claims that competent service, "should have been 
rendered" by the hospital's ambulance service, but was not because of the delay they caused in 
treatment. Indeed, Plaintiffs claim is grounded in the assertion that "the death of [Mrs. 
Carter] was a direct and proximate result of the delay in transporting her to the Beaver Valley 
Hospital," and that if there had been no delay his wife's life could have been saved. Sfi£ 
Complaint, at pp. 2-3. Hence, as the claim is based on a deficiency in the health care service 
provided by Milford Valley Memorial Hospital, the case can readily be classified as a 
malpractice action for purposes of § 78-14-4(1), and is subject to the two year statute of 
limitations required by the act. 
Consequently, because the action was not filed until January 6, 1998, over two years 
from October 8, 1995, the date at which the facts indicate the plaintiff should have discovered 
the act or negligent occurrence, the Court finds that the plaintiffs claim is barred. 
Since dismissal in this case is proper on the basis of the statute of limitations contained 
in § 78-14-4(1), the Court does not reach the separate issues of governmental immunity, or the 
applicability of the statute of limitations for wrongful death actions. 
5 
CONCLUSION 
On the basis of the foregoing, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. 
Counsel for Defendant is to prepare, withing 15 days of the date hereof, an order consistent 
with the terms of this decision and submit it to opposing counsel for approval as to form prior 
to submission to the Court for signature. 
7^ 
Dated this / day of January, 1999. 
P^ C^c^gd— 
J. 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BEAVER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MAX R. CARTER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BEAVER COUNTY and MILFORD 
VALLEY MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, a 
governmental agency of BEAVER COUNTY, 
Defendants. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
CQpy 
Civil No. 98-CV-56 
Judge J. Philip Eves 
This matter having come before the court on defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
and the court having been advised in the premises by memoranda in support of and opposition 
to the above motion, and a Memorandum Decision having been entered on January 7, 1999, the 
court hereby makes the following: 
FINDINGS 
1. On October 8, 1995, Ana Rae Carter, a resident of Minersville, Utah, became 
ill and distressed. Her husband, Max R. Carter, the plaintiff in this action, called for emergency 
assistance from Milford Valley Memorial Hospital. An ambulance was dispatched. Mrs. Carter 
was taken to the Beaver Valley Hospital. 
2, Approximately two and one-third years later, plaintiff filed a complaint in this 
action, alleging that the defendant's negligent care and maintenance of the ambulance caused a 
delay in Mrs. Carter's arrival at the Beaver Valley Hospital, which in turn caused her wrongful 
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3. Milford Valley Memorial Hospital's ambulance service is owned and operated by 
the defendant, Milford Valley Memorial Hospital. 
4. Milford Valley Memorial Hospital is duly created as a separate body politic under 
the Utah Special Service District Act, § 17A-2-1301, et. seq., Utah Code Ann. 
5. Section 78-14-3(11), Utah Code Ann., defines a health care provider as "any 
person, partnership, association, corporation, or other facility . . . who renders health care or 
professional services as a hospital . . . ." 
6. Section 78-14-3(14), Utah Code Ann., defines a malpractice action against a 
health care provider as: 
any action against a health care provider whether in contract, tort, breach of 
warranty, wrongful death, or otherwise, based upon alleged personal injuries 
relating to or arising out of the health care rendered or which should have been 
rendered by the health care provider. 
7. In the present case, the defendant easily qualifies as a health care provider for 
purposes of the Malpractice Act. The defendant is a hospital which renders health care and 
relaled professional services. On October 8, 1995, the defendant provided such health care and 
related professional service to Mrs. Carter through its ambulance operations. Transportation of 
persons in need of health care for the hospital is obviously an integral part of the hospital 
function and is part of the health care provided by the defendant. Indeed, the health care service 
which the defendant provided and upon which the claim of the plaintiff is based is an asserted 
deficiency in such service. 
8. Hence, as the claim is based on a deficiency in the health care service provided 
by Milford Valley Memorial Hospital, the case can be readily classified as a malpractice action 
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for purposes of § 78-14-4(1), Utah Code Ann., and is subject to the two year statute of 
limitations required by the act. 
9. The action was not filed until January 6, 1998, over two years from October 8, 
1995, and the court finds that the plaintiffs claim is barred. 
10. Since the dismissal in this case is proper on the basis of the statute of limitations 
contained in § 78-14-4(1), Utah Code Ann., the court does not reach the separate issues of 
governmental immunity or the applicability of the statute of limitations for wrongful death 
actions. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings, the court now makes and enters the following: 
ORDER 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and the case is dismissed with 
prejudice. _ _ ^ , 
DATED and signed this ^— day of January? 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Floyd W. Holm 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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